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In recent years, the abnormal high compensation of senior executives in 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has been receiving increasing attention from both 
public stakeholders and academic researchers. People are concerned whether firms’ 
performances match these appalling salaries. To control and regulate the excess 
executive compensation in SOEs, Chinese government successively issued two 
editions of ―Pay Ceiling Order‖ in Jan.2009 and Sep.2009. However, due to some 
inherent flaws, like idealistic and rigidity, the practical effect of these regulations has 
been widely questioned.  
Based on above, this paper mainly examines the effect of the government 
regulations on executive compensation by utilizing the Chinese listed companies for 
period 2006-2011 and constructing multiple regression model based on panel data. 
The result indicates that the ―Pay Ceiling Order‖ in 2009 doesn’t take effect. The ―Pay 
Ceiling Order‖ reduces the pay gap between executives and employees .But it fails to 
control the excess CEO salary and make CEO compensation match firm performance 
more closely.What is more, the result manifests that the ―Pay Ceiling Order‖ plays the 
different roles on the different level of SOEs executive salary. For instance, SOEs 
with excess CEO salary decrease their executives cash compensations and the pay gap, 
but perk will substitute cash compensation. In addition, we also find that the ―￥2.8 
million-upper-limit‖ not only fails to control excess compensation in financial SOEs, 
but also awkwardly become a reasonable excuse for other firms to increase their 
executives compensation.  
This paper utilizes comparative analysis by dividing into groups, to verify the 
effectiveness of the ―Pay Ceiling Order‖. We hope to provide scientific evidence for 
the government regulating CEO compensation and to promote the reform of SOEs 
executive compensation incentive mechanism.  
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 1 导论 
1.1 研究背景 
企业高管薪酬一直以来备受社会公众关注和热议，近年来不断曝光的高管
“天价”薪酬更是惹人争议，中国平安银行董事长兼 CEO 马明哲 2007 年获高达





































2009 年 1 月我国财政部颁布《金融类国有及国有控股企业负责人薪酬管理
































































“金融民企”）作为控制样本，运用 T-test 方法，检验结果表明 2009 年的《管理
办法》未能发挥管制金融国企高管薪酬的作用。 
第六部分结论。主要包括了研究结论、政策建议和研究局限。 







































































































高管薪酬的影响，由于 2009 年 1 月的《管理办法》是针对金融国企提出的，本

































































Degree papers are in the “Xiamen University Electronic Theses and Dissertations Database”. Full
texts are available in the following ways: 
1. If your library is a CALIS member libraries, please log on http://etd.calis.edu.cn/ and submit
requests online, or consult the interlibrary loan department in your library. 
2. For users of non-CALIS member libraries, please mail to etd@xmu.edu.cn for delivery details.
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
